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Is willpower just another way of tying oneself to the mast?  
 
 
Introduction: The claim 
Odysseus was able to listen to the Sirens unharmed, even though their song was such 
that everybody else who had heard it before jumped off their ship and died in the sea. 
This episode is certainly one of Odysseus’ finer achievements, but it seems very odd 
to say that it is one where Odysseus showed great strength of will. Odysseus manages 
to achieve his goal by having himself tied to the ship’s mast by his sailors before they 
get close to the Sirens. The sailors then put wax in their ears and so are able to row the 
ship past the Sirens, because they cannot hear them. Odysseus can, but he can’t give 
in to his desire to jump over board, because he is tied to the mast. Because he is tied, 
he cannot decide to give in to temptation. He is not free to do what he wants to do at 
the moment when he hears the Sirens, and therefore it makes little sense to praise him 
for his strength of will in this case.  
Willpower does not seem to play a role in this particular scenario. Odysseus is clearly 
praiseworthy, because he is clever, because he is a good judge of his own mind, and 
he is capable of thinking of ways that will ensure that he will behave in the way that is 
best for his long term interest, even if the temptation to not do that is incredibly 
strong. But even though his cleverness has the same effect as an act of willpower, in 
so far as it allows him to withstand temptation, it seems obvious that it achieves that 
effect by fundamentally different means.1  
In fact, the Odysseus strategy is used to describe a whole class of self control 
strategies that achieve their control aim without apparently having to use willpower, 
i.e. so called tying to the mast strategies.  If an agent uses willpower to withstand 
temptation, they use their capacities as agents to not be tempted, while tying to the 
mast strategies temporarily disable agency for the period in which one might be 
tempted. Willpower is about defeating temptation head on as an agent, tying oneself 
to the mast simply makes it impossible to give in to temptation, whatever the agent 
                                                 
1 See Heath & Anderson 2010 for an argument to the effect that Odysseus should 
count as a case of willpower and Paglieri 2012 for an argument that uses the move 
discussed in the text to dismiss this. 
would want to do at the time. The agent is simply not free to do otherwise in even the 
weakest and most uncontroversial sense of this term.2 
I think this intuition is mistaken.3 I think that there is no qualitative difference 
between the way tying to the mast strategies defeat temptation and the way someone 
defeats temptation by using willpower in the more standard sense. I argue that this is 
because, if we understand willpower in the way that is most plausible (i.e. along the 
lines of Holton 2009, Baumeister 2008, for a brief explanation see section 1, below), 
then willpower operates in a way that is structurally identical to a tying to the mast 
strategy. I argue that in both cases, the agent performs an intentional ‘tying to the 
mast action’ and the ties put in place by that action stop the agent from giving in to 
temptation. The only difference between the specific tying to the mast strategy 
Odysseus uses and the use of standard will power, I argue, lies in the strength and 
durability of the ties that are put in place by the tying action. Obviously, they are 
extremely stable in the Odysseus case and they are relatively flimsy in the standard 
willpower case.  
 
However, my main aim in making this claim is not to defend the radical position that 
the Odysseus case can be seen as a case of willpower, but to complete a far more 
mundane but probably more important task. The Odysseus case is interesting, because 
it is the prototype of a wide variety of ‘tying to the mast’ strategies using both mental 
(e.g. distractions) and non-mental ties. The main aim of this paper is to show that 
there cannot be a clear distinction between these strategies and ‘real’ willpower. This 
is an important task because we use these strategies all the time, and it is important to 
establish whether they are in some sense deficient or inferior to using willpower. It 
seems plausible to me that once my main point is accepted, that one can also accept 
that the Odysseus case is like willpower, but I discuss at various points in the paper 
potential ways of defending the intuition that it is not.  
 
The argument: 
 
1) What is willpower? 
                                                 
2 I.e, she is not free to do otherwise, even if she had desired to do otherwise. 
3 I have in earlier papers (2013, 2014) already developed a similar argument, but did 
not have space to fully discuss this argument there.  
In order to get the argument off the ground, we first need to have an understanding of 
what willpower is supposed to be. Richard Holton has recently provided a very 
plausible account of how we should think about willpower, which I will take as my 
starting point (Holton 2009). Crucially, Holton holds that acts of willpower consist in 
intentional actions, rather than in deliberative exercises of practical rationality. On his 
picture, willpower works in the following way: At some point in time, an agent forms 
an intention to do something in the future, of which she knows that she might not 
want to do it at the time. She might for example form the intention to go for a run on 
Sunday morning on Saturday, but knows that she will not be very keen when Sunday 
morning comes along. Holton calls such intentions which the agent forms, despite 
knowing that her judgement may be in danger of shifting about them by the time they 
have to be implemented, “resolutions” (2009, p.9f). 
Once an agent has formed a resolution, they can now use that resolution in the face of 
temptation in the following way: When the agent notices that she is tempted not to act 
in accordance with the resolution, she rehearses the reasons for not giving in to 
temptation and in that way strengthens her resolve. Crucially, however, this rehearsal 
is not an exercise of deliberation but instead an intentional action that actually 
prevents the agent from engaging in full-blown practical deliberation (2009, p.121f.).  
On the Holton picture, practical deliberation is undesirable in tempting situations, 
because if the agent were allowed to fully deliberate, they would come to the 
conclusion that they should give in to temptation. This is exactly what happens when 
an agent is weak willed. Weakness of the will is a consequence of too much 
deliberation under temptation. Thus, willpower on the Holton picture is necessary 
when our deliberative capacities are in danger of being corrupted by temptation (2009 
chapters 5 & 6).  It is not about preventing oneself from acting against one’s best 
judgement4, but about stopping the rational mind itself being corrupted. The rehearsal 
on this picture is therefore not a fully-fledged exercise in practical rationality, but 
rather a tool to prevent such an exercise. The agent rehearses in order to stop herself 
from deliberating, because deliberation would lead to a judgement shift that would 
rank giving in to temptation higher than pursuing the long term goal. Rehearsals feel 
                                                 
4 Holton reserves the term akrasia for cases of acting against one’s best judgment. 
Holton does not deny that akrasia exists as well, but he does not think that these are 
the cases that are in ordinary usage described as typical weakness of the will 
situations. Strength of will, then, is the ability to resist unwanted judgment shifts. 
like a struggle, because the mind is constantly drawn to the now very salient reasons 
why one should give in to temptation.   
 
But why should we think that this is the right account of willpower? Obviously there 
is no space within this essay to give a full defence of Holton’s view. However, we can 
at least discuss Holton’s two main reasons for holding this account. Both reasons 
seem so plausible that it seems worthwhile to explore the potential implications of his 
account. On the one hand, Holton points to the phenomenology of exercising 
willpower. Resisting temptation feels like a mental struggle, something we have to try 
to do again and again and we have only limited resources to keep up the fight. His 
account captures this intuition very well, but it seems that all accounts that rely on 
practical rationality rather than intentional action will struggle to explain that 
phenomenology. If willpower were simply about evaluating, why would it feel 
effortful? Either the agent evaluates that she should give in to temptation or she 
evaluates that her future goals are more valuable to her, but which ever way she 
decides it seems that there should be no need for any struggle after the evaluation. The 
agent will simply do what she thinks is best. 5 
 Additionally, evaluations seem not to be the kind of thing that we can do 
intentionally anyway (Hieronymi, 2009) but effortful actions always seem to have an 
intentional component. So on the plausible assumption that the phenomenology of 
willpower clearly does contain a mental struggle, evaluative accounts will not be in a 
strong position to explain this phenomenology. 
The second reason for holding his account ties in nicely with the first. It seems that 
the Holton picture fits the wealth of empirical data that have recently been 
accumulated from developmental and social psychology (2009, p.120). For example, 
Holton refers on the one hand to studies of delayed gratification tasks in 
developmental psychology (Mischel, 1996), where subjects are confronted with a 
choice between a small reward now (one cookie), or a large reward (two cookies) ten 
minutes later. In these studies, it could be shown that children perform much better 
when they engage in the kind of rehearsals that Holton talks about. More importantly 
                                                 
5 The only possible struggle here could be between what the agent wants and a 
motivational force that she is alienated from, but weak-willed actions are supposed to 
be fully-fledged actions by the agent, rather than compulsions where the agent cannot 
stand up to an irresistible psychological force outside the agent.  
even, in social psychology, Baumeister (e.g. 2008) and colleagues have produced an 
impressive body of work that seems to indicate that there is a special faculty that 
humans use to achieve self control aims. The most prominent finding here is the 
phenomenon of ego depletion. Baumeister and colleagues could show that resisting 
temptation seems to require the usage of a mental resource that is strictly limited. 
Trying not to eat the cookies will affect the performance on an unrelated task that 
requires the same resource, like gripping a handle bar as hard as you can some time 
later. They could also show that it is possible to train this resource, leading them to 
the very intuitive metaphor of willpower as a mental muscle that can be trained and 
exhausted. Obviously, this work provides great empirical support for Holton’s 
phenomenological observation that willpower is characterized by a mental struggle. 
 
2) Why willpower is a tying to the mast strategy 
 
Thus, Holton provides us with a story of how to think of willpower that seems 
eminently plausible. However, an unintended consequence of that story that I want to 
defend is that willpower on this account is nothing else than a tying to the mast 
strategy. This is because, according to Holton, in a willpower case the agent disables 
her rational evaluation capacities temporarily by rehearsing the argument in order to 
not give in to temptation. On my interpretation, this means that she disables her 
abilities as a mental agent for the time being. If that is right, then it is not the case that 
in contrast to the Odysseus case, agents using willpower fight temptations using their 
agentive powers, but instead they do exactly what the Greek hero did – they 
intentionally bind themselves to a (in their case mental) mast. The ties in this case 
consist in the rehearsal that makes it impossible for the agent to evaluate the situation 
neutrally. 
 
This is the core of the argument, but a lot needs to be said to make it really clear and 
plausible. First of all, some clarifications are in order: Holton does acknowledge that 
our ordinary language use does not clearly distinguish between cases where the agent 
ties him- or herself to the mast mentally, by distracting him- or herself, and cases 
where the agent uses rehearsals. However, Holton believes that only the latter should 
be thought of as agent involving. Following on from this view, Holton legislates that 
only these cases should be thought of as “real” willpower (p.127, 2009). 
Furthermore, my interpretation of Holton’s story differs at a crucial point from his 
own. Holton argues that rehearsal is not arational (p.147, 2009), as I have claimed 
here. However, if the rehearsal is not arational, then it looks as if we can have our 
intentional action account of willpower and be mental agents at the same time. 
Holton’s reason for saying that rehearsal is not arational is that, in contrast to an 
arational strategy, rehearsal does allow the agent to remain moderately reason-
sensitive. If for example it turned out that on Sunday morning there was a snowstorm 
and it would be dangerous to go outside, then the agent would still be able to 
appreciate this danger, despite the fact that she had just got herself out of bed by 
rehearsing her reasons for going for a run. This is in marked contrast to the Odysseus 
scenario, where it would not help Odysseus at all if he recognized a couple of miles 
before the Sirens that his sailors were about to hit an underwater rock. His ties are 
truly arational and Odysseus would not be able to react flexibly to this new situation: 
If the ship sank, he would go down with it.   
 
But even though this sounds very plausible, what is being said here is actually very 
unclear. The Odysseus case is slightly misleading, because it creates the impression 
that the crucial difference between a tying to the mast case and ‘real’ willpower is that 
a tied agent looses all agentive powers and becomes entirely passive, but most 
external ties are not like that.  
Even a very moderate twist to the story can show that. Suppose the Sirens do not 
bring instant death but would nevertheless be able to overcome Odysseus’ clear long 
term preference to get home to Penelope, and imagine also that Odysseus has his leg 
chained to the mast in order to avoid being able to fall for the siren’s song, because 
even while listening to the Sirens he would still prefer having his leg to being with the 
Sirens. This set up seems relevantly parallel to the original story. Odysseus still 
manages to listen to the Sirens without endangering achieving his long term 
preferences, because even though the Sirens song will switch his preferences for the 
time that he hears it, he is not able to do something about it, because the only way that 
he could do something about it would entail doing something that he does not want to 
do (chopping off his leg), even while hearing the Sirens’ song. But even though the 
scenario does look parallel in that respect, there is an interesting difference between 
the two: In this second scenario, if Odysseus sees that the ship will hit a rock, he does 
have the option to cut off his leg in order to avoid going down with the ship. Does that 
mean that the chaining to the mast has now become an intentional action that 
preserves rationality and is perhaps even an act of willpower, because, in this scenario 
some agentive powers are clearly preserved? To argue this would be a very strange 
move for a defender of a position that emphasizes the difference between tying to the 
mast strategies and ‘true’ willpower. Odysseus is still passive with regard to the chain 
that stops him from jumping over board and presumably the defender of real 
willpower will say that this means that there is no willpower necessary at all, if the 
chains ensure that Odysseus is not tempted to jump, because he does not want to cut 
of his leg in order to be able to do so. 
 But if one accepts that this change to the story does not make the Odysseus case a 
case of willpower just because some reason responsiveness is preserved, then the 
example clearly shows that the mere fact that the agent is still reason responsive 
cannot be what distinguishes a rehearsal from a tying to the mast action. So the 
rehearsals must be special in a way that is more than just the fact that the agent stays 
reason responsive. In the next two sections we will look at potential ideas, which 
suggest what this specialness might be. We will examine whether rehearsals are 
special because they contain an element of struggle or whether they might be special 
because they help to confront temptation.  What we will discover however is that 
there is no way in which rehearsals are fundamentally different from mental tying to 
the mast strategies like distractions. Once this core point is accepted it will become 
much less obvious that there could be a clear line between willpower and any tying to 
the mast strategy.  Pushing this line as far as possible brings us back to the claim that 
there is no obvious clear line between even Odysseus cases and real willpower. 
 
 
Objections 
1) Where did all the struggle go? 
 
One of the main reasons to endorse the Holton account was that it got the 
phenomenology of willpower right. As Holton points out, the exercise of willpower 
seems to be characterized by effortful intentional tryings to do the right thing, and 
Holton argued that the main rival accounts are not able to explain this phenomenology 
adequately. For the purposes of this paper, this was assumed to be correct. The paper 
then proceeded to argue that the intentional tryings in the exercise of willpower are 
nothing else than tying to the mast strategies, which are structurally identical to the 
Odysseus scenario. But there seems to be a major problem lurking here. If tying to the 
mast strategies really are like willpower, then it seems that the struggle can’t be an 
essential component of willpower.  Think of e.g. the Odysseus case: Odysseus might 
struggle against his ties, but not because he wants to resist temptation, but because he 
desperately wants to give in to it. More generally, the very point of ties seems to be to 
take the need for a struggle away. So if willpower really consists in tying to the mast 
strategies, then the phenomenology of the struggle must be mistaken. This in turn 
seems to make the whole position unstable, because it was built on the assumption 
that Holton’s account is plausible, but this plausibility in turn rests to a large degree 
on the plausibility of the phenomenology of struggle.6  
 
Answering this very powerful objection will need some careful preparation: First of 
all, there should be a concession. The Odysseus case might be the archetypical tying 
to the mast scenario, but it is not the archetypical willpower scenario. However, this is 
not to concede that it is qualitatively different from ‘true’ willpower cases. The 
concession simply states that Odysseus is a limiting case of the huge variety of 
intentional strategies to control the mind.7 It is a limiting case, because the way the 
story is told, the control by the environment imposed in this case is maximally 
inflexible and installed long before the moment of temptation. In order to get a better 
picture of the claim, it is at this stage necessary to get a better idea of the strategies 
which have a much higher flexibility. 
 
We have seen already that even relatively small tweaks to the story can make quite a 
difference to the intuition that tying to the mast strategies automatically disable all 
agency. Instead what they do is that they restructure the environment in such a way 
that the options for the agent are systematically changed in such a way that the desired 
option is the one that will most likely be the most attractive one for the agent. Still, in 
the tying to the mast case discussed, it is still the case that the chain is very durable, 
the cost of getting out of it is very high, and most importantly, the chain is clearly 
outside Odysseus’ head. Because of all of these factors all defenders of a deep gap 
                                                 
6 Thanks to Mike Ridge for pointing this worry out to me. 
7 For a discussion of the different varieties of intentional strategies to control the mind 
see Vierkant 2012a, 2012b. 
will probably be very confident that my second scenario is not a case of willpower 
either.  All the above scenario could demonstrate was that the difference between 
‘tying to the mast’ scenarios and true willpower cannot consist in the mere fact that a 
tied agent is not at all able to act on reasons. Odysseus with his leg tied is clearly able 
to act, but equally clearly the intuition that this situation is not one where he needs to 
use willpower remains unchanged from the scenario where he is fully chained to the 
mast.   
But all of the conditions which make these cases seem so different from real 
willpower cases are not present for all tying to the mast scenarios. Tying to the mast 
actions can create flimsy ties, breakable at a relatively low cost, and they can happen 
entirely inside one’s head.  
 
Think for example of distraction cases. An agent trying to lose weight might have 
formed the resolution not to eat too much at the lunch buffet, but when the time 
comes and he is standing next to the buffet, he is very tempted by the lovely cakes on 
display. Now, in order to not give into temptation, he might try to engage a colleague 
into a discussion about some departmental gossip, because he knows that this will 
take his mind off the tempting cakes. Even better, if no colleague is at hand, then the 
agent could simply look the other way and try to work out a tricky objection to his 
paper. In these cases, the agent again does something intentional (chatting to the 
colleague, turning away, concentrating on the puzzle) that brings it about that the 
agent does not give into temptation. This is achieved by focusing the attention of the 
agent on something else. Now, according to Holton, such cases are clear tying to the 
mast cases, rather than instances of true willpower, because the agent uses the 
intentional action to avoid temptation, rather than in order to confront it.8 
 
But note that in such cases, quite a few things are different from the Odysseus case. If 
the building were to burn down, then it seems not impossible for the agent to abandon 
the conversation or the objection and to leave the building. In these cases, this does 
not even come at a very high cost. Even more importantly, the gossip might not be 
that interesting and the objection not that pressing, so that it might take the agent quite 
a lot of cognitive effort to keep concentrating on it.  In these cases, the 
                                                 
8 For a very similar argument see Paglieri (2012). 
phenomenology of effort will be very plausible. The less successful the distraction, 
the more effort it will take to maintain it. 
 
The upshot of this obviously is that effort and tying to the mast strategies are not 
mutually exclusive. That being established, it is now quite easy to explain why 
Holton’s observation about the phenomenology of willpower is at least compatible 
with the idea that willpower is nothing more than a tying to the mast strategy. This 
can be done either in a conciliatory, or a more hard nosed, approach. On the soft line, 
the argument would be to accept that Odysseus is not about willpower, because a 
struggle is a necessary condition for willpower, but to maintain that willpower and 
distraction-like cases are simply a sub-class of effortful intentional self control. The 
only difference between them and Odysseus like cases is that they happen in tempting 
situations. On the hard line, one could deny that Holton’s phenomenology argument 
requires us to accept that willpower always involves struggle. Instead, Holton’s 
argument would still work, if it were the case that it typically involves a struggle. As 
all the distraction cases9 fulfil the struggle condition, it would then be possible to be 
hard nosed and to claim that Odysseus-like cases are simply untypical cases of real 
willpower. Either option can maintain the bulk of the argument, but as the soft option 
seems slightly ad hoc, we shall proceed here assuming the hard nosed reply and claim 
that Odysseus is a – albeit limiting – case of willpower. 
  
2) Confronting and avoiding temptation 
 
From the discussion in the last paragraph, it should have become clear that tying to 
the mast strategies very often can involve a struggle in the face of temptation, but 
does this really fully lay to rest the worry that they are not qualitatively different from 
real willpower? One might e.g. object that even if it is true that tying to the mast 
strategies can require effort in the face of temptation, they are still fundamentally 
different from real willpower, because the effort is used to achieve fundamentally 
different things. In the distraction cases, the effort is used to achieve the goal of 
                                                 
9 Note that it will not do here to claim that the qualitative difference between tying to 
the mast cases and willpower-type cases is the difference between goings on inside or 
outside the head. The ties in distraction cases (TV, book, etc.) are very often outside 
the head, but seem to have exactly the same function as the rehearsal. 
diverting attention away from temptation, thereby making agential control less 
arduous. Part of the control effort is taken away from the agent and loaded on to the 
environment. In true willpower cases, on the other hand, the effort is used to confront 
temptation, but with a mindset that does not allow re-evaluation. In other words, it 
does not look as if the agent in these cases relinquishes any control. In fact the very 
opposite seems to be the case: The agent puts her evaluative system, as it were, on a 
short leash and that allows her to confront temptation without being corrupted by it. 
 
Again this seems very intuitive and we will need to construct another distraction case 
to see what is wrong with it. Suppose our agent at the lunch buffet does not avert his 
attention from the buffet, but instead he stares right at a small bit of jelly on one of the 
sandwiches which he finds disgusting in order to curb his desire to give in to 
temptation, or he sets himself the job of arranging the mini pies in such a way that 
they could represent the proposition of the objection that he wants to think about. 
What these examples show is that it is entirely unclear what exactly is meant by the 
idea that someone is confronting temptation. Our agent in this scenario clearly is 
orientated toward the buffet and has his full concentration on it. On the other hand, he 
equally clearly isn’t thinking of the buffet as a temptation that he has to resist, but 
manages by means of a lot of cognitive work to transform it into something disgusting 
or a puzzle. This seems parallel to the rehearsal case. It is true that in one sense the 
agent confronts temptation head on, by repeating his reasons for not giving in it to it. 
But this is very much only one side of the coin. The crucial aspect of the rehearsal, as 
Holton states himself, is the thought that it will prevent the reopening of a real 
deliberation of the merits of not giving in to temptation. This is nothing else than an 
avoidance strategy. The agent does not confront temptation in its full force and reason 
with it. The very point of willpower according to Holton is that the agent is worried 
about being corrupted and stops that slide by avoiding letting himself fully appreciate 
the force of temptation.10 
                                                 
10 One might ask here whether there could not be cases where the agent is aware that 
his long term goal is worth more to him, but needs rehearsals to not be swept away by 
a brute motivational force that he does not agree with. One might think that in such 
cases rehearsal does contribute to deliberation. Cases like that do exist, but they are a) 
not cases of willpower on the Holton definition, because there is no judgment shift 
and b) even more importantly, even in these cases the rehearsal does not contribute to 
 The general point being established, it is time now for a clarification that amounts to a 
small concession. I have shown that rehearsal cases are indirect in the same way that 
distraction cases are indirect. What I have not shown, however, is that distraction and 
rehearsal are always the same thing – but that they are two different variations on the 
same theme. What is more, there is a very simple explanation for why Holton thinks 
that rehearsals but not distraction cases are real willpower: Rehearsals on average 
seem to be harder. It is intuitively very plausible that rehearsing your reasons for not 
giving in to temptation is harder then simply averting attention and this intuition is 
also borne out by the empirical evidence. In the developmental evidence that Holton 
discusses, children found it much easier to distract themselves from the cookies than 
to repeat the reasons for not eating the cookie (Mischel, 1996). In addition, there are 
also fascinating studies with chimps that show that chimps can use distraction 
techniques in order to master delayed gratification tasks, but find it impossible to 
simply stare down temptation, as it were (Evans & Beran, 2007). Thus, it seems 
empirically plausible that rehearsals are more difficult than the employment of some 
distraction strategies. However, all this shows is that some distraction strategies do 
require less cognitive strain than rehearsals, presumably because they are more like 
looking away from the buffet rather than trying to transform the buffet into a puzzle. 
The ties in such cases are more durable, because the tempting stimulus is simply 
removed rather than transformed.  11 
 
3) Tying and being tied 
 
So far I have tried to establish that the rehearsal strategy is nothing else than a 
distraction strategy. This is already an important result, but it invites a possible 
argument against my overall claim that willpower is nothing else than a tying to the 
mast strategy. The sceptic could concede that it is right that distraction cases and 
rehearsal cases are structurally identical, but insist that all that this shows is that even 
                                                                                                                                            
deliberation, but simply makes sure that the outcome of the deliberative process is 
what the agent will do.  Thanks to Rob Rupert for raising this worry. 
11 This leads to an empirical prediction against the Holton account. If Holton is right, 
then strategies like transforming the buffet into a puzzle should not deplete the mental 
muscle, as they are not real willpower. On my account, however, the prediction is that 
they will, because the effort is explained exclusively by maintaining the ties. 
in rehearsals, not the whole process is about willpower. She could accept that even in 
such cases, the effect of the mental ties achieved by the rehearsal are not part of the 
exercise of willpower, but simply a consequence of it – and if that were the case, then 
the same could be said about distraction cases. Bringing about the distraction can be 
willpower, but being distracted cannot be. This has the advantage that willpower 
seems to again reside purely in an intentional action, and seems to be much more 
closely linked to the exercise of agentive powers. It seems right as well with regard to 
the phenomenology of struggle: It seems right that averting attention from the 
tempting stimulus in order to achieve distraction is hard, but once attention is on 
something else, no more real work is done by the agent until attention for whatever 
reason is drawn back to the tempting stimulus.12  
 
This seems very powerful, but again we have to carefully unpack what is being said in 
order to evaluate the force of the objection. First of all, it should be emphasized again 
that this is already a very important concession. It allows that intentional actions that 
have the purpose of achieving the avoidance of temptation count as willpower. This is 
the stated aim of this paper, so the concession admits defeat on the main point of 
contention that there is no qualitative difference between willpower and tying to the 
mast actions. Without further qualifications this would even allow that Odysseus’ 
action of tying himself to the mast is willpower, even if the tied stage is not part of the 
exercise of the capacity. In order to rule out such cases, we need not only accept that 
the action of distracting oneself counts as willpower, but also an extra condition on 
what willpower is. The obvious candidate here could be that willpower requires that 
the intentional action takes place in the tempting situation itself and not beforehand. 
This move would clearly exclude the Odysseus case. But even with this condition in 
place, it is still not obvious that willpower can consist only in the tying stage.  
 
To see why, we need to think about rehearsal again. The idea is that rehearsing the 
reasons for not giving in to temptation might have the effect that we do not reconsider 
in situations where this reconsideration is likely to go wrong. But why do we not 
reconsider in such situations? At a very general level, presumably because the 
rehearsal has some effect on our psychology – i.e., it is the psychological effect of the 
                                                 
12 Thanks to Marcel Brass for raising this worry. 
rehearsal that brings about the desired result. So what is the potential difference 
between rehearsals and distractions? If anything, it presumably is the effect these 
actions have on the system. In fact, the struggle will be a function of the effect. 
Rehearsals could have long lasting or short-term effects. The effects could be stronger 
and weaker, they could be specific or unspecific, they could be additive or not.  But if 
it is the case that the character of an act of willpower is systematically dependent on 
the effect it has on a cognitive system, then it becomes quite ad hoc to claim that 
willpower consists only in the act but not in the effect it is having. 
 
So it seems that willpower, on this more subtle picture, is a complicated interaction 
between the tying and the tied up part of the mind. But if this is the right way to think 
about willpower, then it is just not possible to have a deeper understanding of 
willpower if we do not examine the nature of the ties, as well as the act of tying – and 
this in turn means that the final objection to this account fails. Willpower, whether it 
comes as a rehearsal or a distraction, is willpower because it is an intentional action 
that has a self-control effect, and if we want to understand a specific act of willpower, 
then we will have to examine the ties as well as the tying. 13 
 
 
4) System One and System Two 
 
Before we can wrap up there is one more important worry that needs to be discussed. 
Holton argues that an exercise of practical rationality should not feel like a struggle, 
but to readers of Baumeister, this may seem surprising. Baumeister thinks in the two 
systems terminology14 and conscious deliberation according to him is a System 2 
                                                 
13 The same goes for a related distinction: It might be claimed that the real dividing 
line is between ties that disrupt deliberation (rehearsal and distraction) and ties that 
disrupt acting on the consequences of flawed deliberation (both Odysseus scenarios). 
Thanks to Rob Rupert for raising this issue. But even here, it is not clear that we can 
uphold the distinction. Distraction might normally occur during deliberation, but it is 
also works after a judgment shift has occurred.   
14 The two systems approach is a very popular way in current psychology to divide 
the mind into two different systems. System one is characterized as a fast, parallel, 
unconscious and involuntary system, while system two is supposed to be slow, serial, 
conscious and voluntary. For an overview see e.g. Evans 2003. For a skeptical 
perspective see e.g. Keren, G. & Schul, Y. (2009). 
activity and hence effortful.15 This seems worrying for the Holton account, because if 
practical deliberation is always effortful, it looks as if one of the main reasons for 
rejecting a deliberative account of willpower does not work any more.16 The 
phenomenology of struggle is explained by the fact that rational deliberation is a 
system 2 activity. 
 
There is a very short answer here, but it points to a very deep problem. The short 
answer is that Baumeister simply employs the term ‘deliberation’ differently. On the 
Holton account, deliberation is simply evaluative activity, whereas on the Baumeister 
account, deliberation is a specific psychological process. Deliberation on the 
Baumeister account contains evaluative episodes, but it also contains a large amount 
of what Galen Strawson (2003) calls ‘shepherding actions’. These are intentional 
actions like focusing, concentrating, rehearsing, etc. that support evaluative processes.   
So the answer to the worry is that we simply have to be clear that it is the Holton use 
of deliberation as evaluation that we are concerned with here, and that therefore the 
Baumeister account of deliberation is simply off topic. 17 
 
Wrapping up and consequences of the view: 
 
Intuitively, willpower and tying to the mast strategies are two very different ways of 
achieving self control, but on a closer look it turns out that the two strategies are not 
                                                 
15 But from here, it looks as if a worry about Holton’s account could be constructed. 
Perhaps whether something is a struggle has less to do with the question of whether it 
is an intentional action, but whether it is system 1 or system 2 controlled. An 
argument like this has in fact been put forward by Neil Levy for cases of weakness of 
the will (2011). Levy argues that strength of will is not a specific faculty (as Holton 
would have it), but simply requires system 2 resources. Holton is aware of Levy (see 
page 134) and does not think that this is a problem for him. He is simply happy to 
accept that strength of will is probably a system 2 phenomenon, and doubts whether it 
is clear that Levy has a strong argument that it is not a specific faculty within this 
system.   
16 Thanks to Robin Scaife for pointing out this worry. 
17 There is a more interesting question lurking here though. If conscious deliberation 
in system 2 is effortful, then perhaps the question discussed here about the role of 
intentional actions for willpower is only the tip of the iceberg of a much wider 
question about the nature of practical rationality and the role of intentional action in it 
in general. I very much suspect that this is the case, but this clearly falls outside the 
scope of this paper.  
really different at all. Instead what we find is that tying to the mast strategies vary 
greatly with regard to the strength and durability of the ties employed.  
 
It was then proposed that willpower simply is a tying to the mast strategy, but one that 
employs relatively weak and flexible ties. Like all tying to the mast strategies, 
willpower restructures the cognitive environment in such a way that evaluations under 
temptation are much more likely to go the way that the agent desires them to go. One 
obvious interesting question here is whether this view has consequences: One might 
e.g. worry that it provides a disincentive to train the mental muscle that Baumeister 
and colleagues discovered. If it does not make a difference whether I tie myself to the 
mast or whether I challenge temptation with the power of the will, why bother going 
through all the effort of training the muscle? But this would be a complete 
misinterpretation of the claim advanced here. The claim defended is not that there is 
no mental muscle, but that the mental muscle is nothing else than a way of achieving 
self control by employing very weak and short-lived ties. If this is right, then the main 
different empirical prediction to Holton has to be that it might well be possible to find 
e.g. distraction strategies that lead to a similar level of ego depletion as Holton’s 
rehearsals. This should be the case exactly when the strength and durability of the 
distraction has the same weak restructuring effect of the cognitive environment as the 
rehearsal would have.          
 
The lesson from Odysseus is not that we do not need willpower, but that it operates in 
a less mysterious way than previously thought. This must be good news not only for 
people who are interested in the nature of willpower, but also for everyone who could 
do with being able to employ it a bit more effectively – and there might be quite a few 
of those...   
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